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IN THE SUPREME 'COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK. 
IN GRAND JUNCTION, 
a National Banking Association, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RALPH OSBORNE and 
JIM L. HUDSON, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
Case No. 
12804 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF 
The Trial Court granted plaintiff, First Nation-
al Bank in Grand Junction, a directed verdict upon 
the conclusion of the evidence, and defendant, Hud-
son, appealed. The Court reversed and ordered a new 
trial. Bank petitions this Court for a rehearing with 
respect to its decision of November 17, 1972, and 
urges the Court to permit additional oral argument 
with respect to the issues and facts. 
The Bank believes that the Court's decision af-
firms the trial court's determination to the effect 
that Hudson's signature on the Loan Guaranty 
Agreement is geniune and that such fact, not having 
been disputed by Hudson in this appeal, is no longer 
in issue. If the foregoing statement is not correct, 
clarification is essential to the final disposition of 
this case. 
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Bank believes the Court may have been inade-
quately informed of the issues in this case and urges 
the Court to reconsider the issues as hereafter set 
out. 
POINT I 
THIS IS A CONTRACT CASE. 
THE DEFENSE RAISED IS FRAUD. 
On page 2 of the decision the Court states: "We 
do not believe this is a case of fraud at all." The 
suit obviously involves a contract-a contract of 
guaranty; however, the entire thrust of Hudson's 
defense in the trial court and his appeal is based 
upon the theory of fraud in factum: that Hudson's 
signature was fraudulently obtained "by trick, ruse, 
slight of hand or other artifice .... " (Pages 32, 36, 
41, 47, 56, 59 and 62 of Hudson's brief.) The Super-
ior Court of New Jersey stated in 1961: 
The defense of fraud in the f actum presents 
in theory a somewhat confused intermingling 
of tort and contract principles. At the heart of 
the assertion of non est fact um is the absence 
of that degree of mutual assent prerequisite 
to formation of a binding contract; absent the 
proverbial "meeting of the minds" one cannot 
be said to have obligated himself in law and 
the purported transaction is regarded as void. 
This is basic contract doctrine. . . . (Cases 
cited.) Thus, where the signer of the instru· 
ment has been led to believe and does believe 
that he is signing something of a different 
character from the note he actually does i~· 
scribe, he has not in fact assented to the obh· 
gation represented by the paper. 
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The New Jersey Superior Court also held in the same 
case that the burden is upon the signer to prove his 
defense of fraud in the fact um: 
The imposition upon the maker of the burden 
of establishing freedom from negligence, as an 
essential ingredient of his defense of fraud in 
the factum . .. (cases cited) ... comprises 
more than empty verbiage. It is an explicit 
direction to the signer of an instrument to 
come forward either with evidence that the 
physical circumstances of the signing and rep-
resentations made to him were so far removed 
from the realm of negotiable paper that he 
could not reasonably have fore seen or other-
wise observed the subsequent effect of his sig-
nature, or to produce proof of legally mitigat-
ing circumstances in the form of his own 
physical or mental inability to comprehend the 
essence of the deception. Factors to be consid-
ered in mitigation may include physical disa-
bility (e.g. blindness), illiteracy, unfamiliar-
ity with the English language, low general in-
telligence, unfamiliarity with commercial 
transactions, unavailability of interpretive 
aid, and misrepresentation by means of physi-
cal deceution (e.g. substitution of papers by 
slight of hand). Bancredit Inc. v. Bethea, 68 
N.J. Super. 62, 172 A.2d 10 at 41 (1961). 
The rules of law on this point are generally dis-
cussed at 160 A.L.R. 1285 wherein some courts 
equate fraud in factum with forgery or other fraud-
ulent acts which go to the heart of the contract--
that there is no contract at all; however, there is one 
essential difference from a forgery. The signer can-
not protect himself against a forger; but here when 
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in fact Hudson signed the document, Hudson could 
have averted the loss by not signing the Loan Guar-
anty Agreement. The courts sometimes ref er to 
equitable arguments in these cases by saying that , 
equity will not permit the defendant to assert that 
the agreement which he signed and upon which the 
plaintiff justifiably relied, to its damage, was a nul-
lity. Where one of two innocent parties must suffer, 
the law should fall upon the one who by his mis- > 
placed confidence has made the fraud possible. Judge 
of Probate v. Nudd, 105N.H.311, 199 A.2d 296 
(1964) and Standard Surety & Casualty Co. v. oi. 
sen, 150 F.2d. 385 (8th Cir. 1945.) 
Fraud in the inducement is another type of 
fraud which is often misunderstood, and in this case 
the theories have been intermingled. In the induce-
ment theory the signer of the document knows he is 
signing the document but is induced to do so by 
fraudulent misrepresentations. Hudson in no respect 1 
contends this is an inducement; however the evidence 
at the trial suggests inducement in that Osborn sol-
icited Hudson's financial cooperation to buy control-
ling interest in the Moab bank. In the inducement 
theory the general rule of law (no Utah cases) pro- ' 
vides that the Bank may recover from Hudson unless 
Bank has knowledge of Osborne's fraud; however, 
even in the inducement theory Hudson has the bur-
den of proving the fraud: 
'"Misrepresentation or fraud by a principal to 
a surety are not chargeable to the obligee ab-
4 
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sent proof that the obligee had notice thereof. 
Chrysler Corporation v. Hanover Insurance 
Company, 350 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1965), 38 
Am.Jur.2d., page 1061, quoted infra. 
Johnson v. Allen, 108 U. 148, 158 P.2d 134 (1945), 
while not involving a third party (the Bank, here) 
is a typical inducement case. In Johnson v. Allen this 
Court affirmed a directed verdict between parties to 
the alleged fraud (i.e. Osborne and Hudson), saying 
at P. 138: 
"The evidence of fraud must be clear, precise 
and indubitable; otherwise it should be with-
drawn from the jury." 
Can Hudson in this case have a lesser burden here 
against the innocent third party Bank than he would 
have if Hudson sued Osborne directly? 
The Court in its decision acknowledges that the 
case is based upon the alleged fraud in factum of 
Osborne when, in the last full paragraph of the ma-
jority decision, the Court states: "If Hudson was 
imposed upon to sign a paper which he never in-
tended to sign; or if he did not know his signature 
was being affixed to the Loan Guaranty Agreement 
... " Further, the Court in its decision, by ruling 
that the proffered testimony regarding Osborne's 
motive to procure the Hudson signature by "trick 
or fraud" was admissible confirms that this is a 
case of fraud inf actum. 
This being a case of fraud, it matters little 
whether in factum or inducement; Hudson has the 
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burden of pleading and proving the fraud, as re. 
quired by Rule 9 (b) of Utah Rules of Civil Proced. 
ure and the leading Utah case as to the elements of 
fraud Oberg v. Sanders, 111 U. 507, 184 P.2d 229 
(1947), both of which are cited and quoted in Bank's 
brief previously filed. The Court determined that 
Hudson has a burden of going forward with the 
evidence; however, the Court makes the puzzling 
comment, " ... the ultimate burden of showing an ' 
agreement is on the Plaintiff." Does this mean that 
Bank has the ultimate burden of proving the absence 
of fraud? If this is the ruling of this Court, it is 
clearly contrary to the authorities cited in this para-
graph and Rule 1 ( 4) of U.R.E. On the other hand, ' 
if Hudson has the burden of proving the fraud, then 
the excluded evidence is not relevant since it does not 
prove a fraud but merely proves that Osborne had a 
possible motive to commit a fraud. In no event does 
it prove the fraud clearly, precisely and indubitably 
as required by Johnson v. Allen, supra. 
On page 2 of the Court's opinion it cites 38 
Am.Jur.2d, Guaranty, Section 55, at page 1058. Im-
mediately below this paragraph and on the same 
page it is provided: 
"The rules as to mistake, and relief against 
mistake, which apply to contracts generally 
apply to guaranty contracts. Thus, when the 
guarantor seeks to avoid li~bility ~n his prom- , 
ise of guaranty-the promise havmg bPen ac-
cepted by the creditor-on the basis that he 
(the guarantor) did not understand the legal 
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significance of the document which he signed 
the concept of objective mutual assent ofte~ 
precludes such defense .... The present rule 
requires the guarantor to read (at least if he 
can read), to inquire as to facts which would 
be apparent to reasonable persons, and to un-
derstand the legal significance of the docu-
ment which he is signing. Any mistake which 
could have been corrected by due diligence 
and which is not the result of imposition prac-
ticed on the guarantor by the creditor (or 
someone for whom the creditor is responsible) 
is not a basis :for rescinding the guaranty 
agreement if the creditor reasonably relied on 
the promise of the guarantor." 
Further, in Section 58, page 1061, it is stated: 
"While the guarantor may successfully defend 
the creditor's action by showing that his exe-
cution of the contract of guaranty was pro-
cured by imposition which was practiced by 
the creditor, he cannot defeat a recovery by 
proof that he executed the instrument as a re-
sult of misconduct on the part of the principal 
debtor. On the contrary, if the creditor did 
not participate therein or have knowledge 
therein, recovery by him is not defeated by the 
fact that the debtor induced the guarantor to 
execute the contract by false representations 
or other misconduct." 
The Court states: "When the plaintiff proved 
the signature on the Loan Guaranty Agreement to be 
that of Hudson, it made out a prima facie case and 
the burden of going forward with evidence would 
fall upon the defendant Hudson." Hudson totally 
failed to go forward with any evidence except his 
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self-serving declaration neither admitting nor deny-
ing the signature ( R. 7 and R. 98), coupled with an 
offer of proof that Osborne had a motive to commit 
a fraud. No evidence was admitted or offered that 
Osborne did in fact impose upon Hudson or trick ' 
Hudson into signing the Loan Guaranty Agreement. 
If the Court's opinion in this case requires the Bank 
to prove the absence of fraud, the decision would 
permit any party to a written contract to at least , 
have a jury pass on the issue whenever he states 
that he does not know how his signature got on the 
paper-notwithstanding a finding by the trial court 
that such person in fact signed the contract. 
POINT II 
OSBORNE'S ST ATF,MPNT TO A THIRD 
PARTY IS NOT ADMISSIBLE. 
The Bank urges the Court to reconsider its opin-
ion that the proffered testimony by Osborne to a 
third party, referring to Hudson: '"I finally was 
able to hang one on him. I've been laying for him 
for some time and I finally got the chance to do it." 
is admissible in thiCJ case between Bank and Hudson. 
The Bank for this argument concedes that such 
statement would be admissible against Osborne if 
he were sued by Hudson; however, he has not been 
so sued, and Osborne is not in this case. The trial 
court, in addition to finding that the matter was 
hearsay and hence objectionable, also found that the 
1 
statement was vague and indefinite. The person of· 
f ering the testimony was not able to tie Osborne's 
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reference to the possibility that Osborne had de-
frauded Hudson. Is it not just as logical to speculate 
that Osborne was referring to the fact that Hudson 
had agreed to be his guarantor and was now being 
called upon to make good on his guaranty? Bank 
submits that its speculation is just as valid as Hud-
son's speculation that Osborne was making an ad-
mission that he had practiced a fraud (a civil 
wrong) against Hudson. If Rule 55 of Rules of Evi-
dence is applicable (see Point IV), it requires that 
the material be relevant and that such evidence prove 
some material fact. The relevancy is speculative. 
Even assuming the Hudson view of the speculation, 
the evidence would not prove the fraud but would 
only tend to prove Osborne's motive or intent with 
respect thereto. For emphasis, the Bank again 
states: This is not a case between Hudson and Os-
borne! 
POINT III 
HUDSON'S OFFER OF PROOF THAT OSBORNE 
USED THE MONEY TO COVER UP DEF ALCA-
TIONS NEITHER PROVES NOR DISPROVES 
THAT HUDSON SIGNED THE LOAN GUARAN-
TY AGREEMENTS NOR THAT HE WAS IM-
POSED UPON BY OSBORNE IN SIGNING THE 
SAME. 
For the purposes of argument the Bank ack-
nowledges that in a case between Hudson and Os-
borne the proffered testimony would show that Os-
borne had a motive to obtain money; however, in 
this instance between the Bank and Hudson, such 
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evidence would not cast any light on the issue of 
whether Hudson was imposed upon by Osborne to 
sign the Loan Guaranty Agreement, not knowing it 
was such an agreement. The law throughout the 
United States is clear that if a person is imposed 
upon by fraud in the inducement, i.e. that he is in-
duced by misrepresentation to sign a document (well 
knowing that he was signing the document), such a 
person may use such fraud to recover against the 
debtor (Osborne) but may not use such defense 
against the creditor (the Bank). 71 A.L.R. 1278. 
Thus the speculation of Hudson's dilemma: Not be-
ing able to off er evidence to the effect that he was 
fraudulently induced by Osborne into signing the , 
agreement (since the law of inducement would not 
afford him a defense), Hudson has denied that he 
signed the agreement, and for his only proof offers 
the fact that Osborne had a motive-Le. Osborne 
needed money to cover defalcations. The Bank urges 
the Court that the inducement speculation is as valid ' 
as the factum speculation. Neither possibility is 
more probable than the other. This being so, the 
proffered evidence does not tend to prove the ulti-
mate fact and should not be received into evidence. 
POINT IV 
MISAPPLICATION OF RULE 55, UTAH RULES 
OF EVIDENCE. 
The Court cites Rule 55, Rules of Evidence, to 
support its opinion that Osborne's statement to a 
third party, inferring the commission of a civil 
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wrong, is admissible to prove Osborne's alleged im-
position upon Hudson. Bank urges that this view of 
Rule 55 is not correct. Rule 55 provides that evidence 
of one committed civil wrong may be introduced to 
show motive, intent (or other relevant material 
fact) relative to the commission of a second civil 
wrong. Here Hudson seeks to use the Osborne state-
ment to a third party to prove the fraud in the first 
instance. Rule 55 does not cover that situation. If 
Hudson wants to have Osborne's statements in evi-
dence, Hudson could either depose Osborne or join 
him. Hudson did neither. 
POINT V 
HUDSON DID NOT OFFER ADMISSIBLE EVI-
DENCE TO OVERCOME THE BANK'S PRIMA 
FACIE CASE THAT THE SIGNATURE WAS 
HIS. 
If the Court affirms the preliminary statement 
by the Bank in this brief to the effect that the Hud-
son signature is genuine, this Point V is not rele-
vant; however, if the question of the genuineness is 
still before the Court, it urges the Court to consider 
the point. 
When Bank presented expert testimony to prove 
Hudson's signature, the burden of going forward 
with the evidence to disprove the signature shifted 
to Hudson. No evidence was presented by Hudson 
except his self-serving declaration neither admitting 
nor denying the signature. If there were genuine 
doubt as to the genuineness of the signature, expert 
witnesses for Hudson undoubtedly would have tes-
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tified and the jury would then have had the oppor-
tunity of making a factual determination as to 
whether or not the signature was in fact Hudson's. 
In the absence of any such evidence on Hudson's be-
half, the trial court came to the only conclusion that 
could follow from the facts-that Hudson signed 
the agreement. The Court's opinion needs clarifica-
tion on this point. Does the Court dispute the finding 
of the trial court that Hudson signed the Loan Guar-
anty Agreement? On page 2 of its opinion the Court 
seems to agree with the trial court, saying: "When 
the plaintiff proved the signature ... "; however, 
the ruling that "there was a question for the jury" 
begs the question: What question is there for the , 
jury to decide? 
POINT VI 
BANK MET ITS "ULTIMATE" BURDEN OF 
SHOWING AN AGREEMENT. CLARIFICATION 
OF DECISION NEEDED. 
The Court on page 2 of its decision states that ' 
the Bank, having made out a prima facie case, "the 
burden of going forward with evidence would fall 
upon the defendant Hudson. However, the ultimate 
burden of showing an agreement is on the plaintiff." 
The Bank urges that it met its ultimate burden by 
showing the signature of Hudson, an agreement in 
writing and consideration, the consideration being 
the loan to Osborne. 38 Am.Jur.2d, Guaranty, Sec· 
tions 43 and 44, pages 1045to1047. 
If the Court does not reverse its decision as 
12 
previously urged and continues its decision requir-
ing a new trial, Bank urges the Court to clarify its 
decision with respect to burden of proof. Rule 76(a) 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure directs the Court to 
determine all questions of law necessary to the final 
determination of the case. Bank renews its position 
that the burden to prove the fraud in f actum is on 
Hudson and that Bank in any event proved its "ulti-
mate" burden. If the Court is of a contrary opinion, 
clarification of its decision with reference to burden 
of proof as to the alleged fraud practiced on Hudson 
is also necessary to aid the trial court in the retrial 
of this case. 
Bank urges the Court that justice requires ad-
ditional arguments in this case to more fully pre-
sent the issues to the Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM H. NELSON 
500 First National Bank Bldg. 
Grand Junction, Colorado 
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190 North Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 
L. ROBERT ANDERSON 
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